When Donald Trump announced the formation of the Board of Peace (BoP) in January 2026, it immediately ignited intense global debate.
Supporters framed the initiative as a corrective mechanism to address paralysis within traditional multilateral institutions, while critics questioned its structure, lifetime chairmanship and whether it might dilute the authority of established bodies such as the United Nations. Beyond the controversy, however, lies a more strategic question: what does the world expect from participating states, and what does Pakistan’s participation in this initiative actually signify?
The BoP presents itself as an agile, policy-driven platform focused on post-conflict governance, reconstruction coordination and stabilisation design. Its first full meeting of leaders and foreign ministers is scheduled to be held in Washington, D.C. on February 19, where it will face its first real test of translating rhetoric into action.
At the centre of the agenda is President Trump’s announcement of a multi-billion-dollar reconstruction fund for Gaza Strip, aimed at rebuilding critical infrastructure, housing and services. Delegations are also expected to discuss a UN-authorised International Stabilisation Force (ISF) for Gaza, while formalising the board’s internal structure, mandate and secretariat, and clarifying how it will complement existing UN-led processes.
Membership in the BoP implies significant expectations. First, it signals humanitarian credibility — including commitments to civilian protection, safe aid delivery and rights-based governance. In Gaza, where humanitarian access, political inclusion and long-term stability are deeply intertwined, these standards will be closely scrutinised.
Second, member states are expected to contribute policy depth. The board is not designed as a ceremonial forum; it aims to develop governance blueprints for transitional administrations, coordinate multinational contributions and potentially recommend stabilisation mechanisms. Countries joining must therefore bring operational experience, institutional insight and diplomatic seriousness.
Third, legitimacy remains central. Because the BoP operates alongside established global institutions, participating states are expected to ensure it complements rather than undermines international law. Respect for human rights, representation of affected populations and adherence to legal norms will remain essential benchmarks of credibility.
Within this framework, Pakistan’s participation carries layered meaning. The country has long been among the largest contributors to UN peacekeeping missions, deploying more than 150,000 peacekeepers across dozens of missions worldwide over six decades. This experience gives Pakistan practical insight into how multinational peace operations function, where they fail and how they can be improved.
Pakistan also brings diplomatic reach through its active engagement in forums such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, while maintaining working relationships with major powers. In a polarised global environment, such bridge diplomacy carries value.
On Palestine, Pakistan’s stance has remained consistent. Islamabad supports the two-state solution as the only viable path to lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians, based on pre-1967 borders with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as the capital of a sovereign Palestinian state. Its engagement in the Board of Peace is therefore anchored in the belief that any reconstruction or stabilisation effort must reinforce — not dilute — this political pathway.
There is also a second geopolitical dimension. Some analysts in India argue that Pakistan may eventually seek to use the BoP platform to highlight the Kashmir dispute, particularly if the board’s mandate expands beyond Gaza. While the current focus remains Gaza-centric, the perception that the forum could one day address other unresolved conflicts adds another strategic layer to Pakistan’s participation.
From a branding perspective, Pakistan’s entry into a peace-oriented multilateral forum is both symbolic and strategic. Participation by a nuclear-armed Muslim state underscores that strategic capability and peace advocacy are not mutually exclusive. It also projects Pakistan as a responsible stakeholder willing to engage in stabilisation efforts beyond its immediate region.
At the same time, this status brings responsibility. The international community expects nuclear-armed states to demonstrate restraint, institutional maturity and commitment to international norms. Pakistan’s involvement in shaping sensitive discussions — including those on a potential international force in Gaza — can therefore be read as an effort to reinforce its image as a constructive actor in global security dialogues.
Pakistan also offers experience in internal stabilisation and counter-extremism, having spent more than two decades confronting insurgency, non-state actors and hybrid threats. Its lessons in counter-radicalisation, rehabilitation and community engagement, though imperfect, remain relevant to post-conflict environments.
Economic diplomacy forms another potential contribution. Sustainable peace requires livelihoods, institutional trust and credible governance. Within the BoP framework, Pakistan can advocate reconstruction models that integrate economic revitalisation with institutional strengthening and link Gaza’s rebuilding to broader regional connectivity — while respecting Palestinian ownership and rights.
Yet careful calibration is essential. Pakistan must avoid any perception of endorsing frameworks that weaken established international institutions or sideline the UN. Officials have indicated that attending the inaugural BoP meeting does not constitute a blank cheque, but rather an effort to remain engaged in a forum that could shape Gaza’s future while defending core principles.
Ultimately, the Board of Peace remains an evolving experiment in global governance. Its Washington meeting will indicate whether it can deliver credible commitments on reconstruction, security and governance without deepening geopolitical divides.
For Pakistan, the platform offers both opportunity and scrutiny. It can move from being primarily a contributor to peacekeeping missions to a policy influencer in emerging peace architectures. It can reinforce its commitment to the two-state formula for Palestine. And it can demonstrate that a nuclear-armed Muslim country can play a leading role in peace advocacy.
Whether this potential translates into lasting influence will depend on how effectively Islamabad aligns principle with policy and symbolism with substance — starting with how it conducts itself at the Washington table.
